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RECENT CASES
BAILMENTS-PARKING STATION OWNER AS BAILEE-Plaintiff was accus-

tomed to park his car at the defendant's parking station, receiving thereupon a
receipt on which was stated "Charges are for use of parking space only and management assumes no liability of any kind." The evidence disclosed that on driving
up to the entrance of the station, an employee of defendant would take charge and
drive the car into position. On surrender of the receipt the employee would
redeliver the car. On the particular occasion the car of the plaintiff was stolen
from the station and badly damaged. Held, that the relation of bailor and bailee
was established and that the defendant was liable for negligence. Baione v.
Heavey, 158 Atl. 18I (Pa. Super. 1932).
The duties and liabilities of the garage owner have been frequently before
the court and, in analogy to the livery stable keeper,' he has been held a bailee for
hire. 2 The duty to use reasonable care for the safety of the car has thus been
established,3 and liability follows theft or damages due to the negligence of the
garage keeper.4 The liability of the parking station owner has been litigated in
but three cases,3 and in one of them it was held that no bailment was created
because the essential element--delivery of possession--was lacking." Inasmuch
as a delivery of possession is quite generally required in the case of a bailment".
the instant case cannot be said to settle the status of parking station owners conclusively, for the decision might be rested on the particular set of facts which
showed a delivery of possession and rebutted the appearance of a lease created by
the receipt. Once a bailment is found, although liability may be limited by contract, the limitation is strictly construed 8 and does not go to the extent of reliev1 "The rights, and duties and liabilities of garage keepers are analogous in many respects
to those of livery stable keepers and warehousemen. As to motor vehicles left in the care of
a garage keeper, he is a bailee for hire, and as such is liable for any loss or damage to the
property resulting from his negligence. . . . Unlike common carriers, innkeepers and
certain other bailees for hire, he is in no sense an insurer of the property committed, to his
care." Hanna v. Shaw, 244 Mass. 57, 59, 138 N. E. 247, 248 (1923).
B.RRY, Au.Tro-oBEs (6th ed. 1929) § 1655; Morgan Millworks v. Dover Garage Co.,
30 Del. 383, ioS Atl. 62 (1919) ; Hanna v. Shaw, supra note i; Hare v. Mulligan, 77 Pa.
Super. 577 (1921). As bailee he may maintain an action against a wrongdoer. Johnson v.
Florida Brewing Co., go Fla. 148, 105 So. 139 (1925) ; Warren v. Finn, 84 N. J. 2o6, 86 Atl.

530 (1913).

"Stevens v. Stewart Warner Speedometer Corp., 223 Mass. 44, iI N. E. 771 (1916);
\annatta v. Tolliver, 82 Pa. Super. 546 (1924); Gordon v. Gershman, 95 Pa. Super. 43
(1928).

'Emms v. Williams, 232 Ill. App. 439 (1924) (damages) ; Hare v. Mulligan, supra note
2 (theft); Tacoma A. L. Co. v. Union M. C. Co., 87 Wash. lO2, 151 Pac. 243 (915)
(theft).
'Principal case; Ex parte Mobile Light & R. Co., 21 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177 (1927),
rcv'g 2o Ala. App. 163, IOI So. 175 (1924) ; Galowitz v. 'Magner, 2o8 App. Div. 6, 2o3 N. Y.
Supp. 42

(1924).

'Ex parte Mobile Light & R. Co., supra note 5, at 526, 101 So. at 178.
'BEAL, BAILMExTS (3900) 6; Bash v. Reading Cold Storage and Ice Company, ioo Pa.
Super. 359, 362 (1930). ". . . a bailment implies a delivery of possession of personal property to a bailee by a bailor, with the obligation on the part of the bailor to redeliver possession."
' "Ordinarily, in cases of this kind, men do not intentionally subject their property to the
hazard of being lost through the lack of ordinary care to prevent the loss. A provision of
the bailment contract which subjects the property to such a hazard is unreasonable. Therefore a provision which is relied upon by the bailee as exempting him from the exercise of
reasonable care with respect to the safety of the property, will be strictly construed by the
courts, and will not be interpreted as effecting the exemption if any other meaning may be
reasonably ascribed to the language employed." Langford v Nevin, 337 Tex. 130, 133, 298
S. V. 536, 537 (1927).
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ing against the bailee's own negligence.9 While an implied contract of care
might well be found, in any case not expressly provided for,"0 where, as in the
instant case, there is an express clause negativing such liability, it would seem
that the public can be adequately protected in its increasing use of this convenience
only by finding the existence of a bailment relationship. In view of the small
difficulty encountered in finding a bailment in the cases of garage owners the
courts might very well apply the same tactics to parking station owners.
BrLLS AND NOTES-BANKS AND BANKI-NG-BANK CREDIT AS VALUE-The

defendant had an agreement with a trust company whereby the former drew bills
in favor of the latter on X, the defendant having the right to draw against the
credit established by the instruments and the trust company having the right to
charge back. The drafts in question were restrictively endorsed by the trust
company and, according to previous dealings, were sent to the plaintiff bank to
have drawee accept, the plaintiff in the meantime crediting the trust company,
which drew against the account. The defendant-drawer instructed X not to
accept since the trust company had closed. The plaintiff brought an action on
the drafts and the defendant demurred to the evidence. Held, that trust company
having purchased for value, the plaintiff could recover on the restrictive indorsement. 1 National City Bank of St. Louis v. Macon Creamery Co., 46 S. W. (2d)
L27 (Mo. 1932).

The instant case presents a problem upon which there is a divergence of
opinion. The mere crediting of the account of a depositor has been held insufficient to constitute the bank a holder for value of an instrument under an unquestionable majority of the decisions both before and after the passage of the
Negotiable Instruments Act.2 There has been, however, some authority under
the uniform act which adopts the more logical and practical view, i. C., that the
crediting in itself will constitute value. 3 This latter view has been suggested as
the proper one under the uniform act since value in this act was intended to be
the same as the consideration necessary for a binding contract.- If the bank had
given dollar bills for the instrument, which were immediately redeposited, there
is no doubt that even the majority courts would consider value. 5 The principal
case declares that there is no difference between the two situations, and correctly
so.0 The reason behind the majority view is that since the bank can cancel the
'BERRY,

op. cit. supra note 2, § 1627; Scott Auto & Supply Co. v. McQueen, III Okla.
iop Conn. 365, 146 Atl. 846 (I929). But see

IO7, 226 Pac. 372 (1925) ; Maynard v. James,

Automobile Underwriters of America v. Laughlin, 6 La. App. 67 (927).
See Galowitz v. Magner, supra note 5.
'Another possible construction of the decision in the instant case might have been that
piaintiff, though a restrictive endorsee, was a holder in due course. The overwhelming weight
of authority, however, is to the contrary. See BRANNAXN, NEGOTIABLE INTSTRU.MENTS (5th ed.
1932) 436 et seq.
' Thompson v. Sioux Falls Bank, 150 U. S. 231, 14 Sup. Ct. 94 (893) ; Manufacturer's
Nat. Bank v. Newell, 71 Wis. 309, 37 N. W. 42o (1888) ; Merchants Nat. Bank v. Marden
Co., 234 Mass. i6I, 125 N. E. 384 (i919); Hightstown Trust Co. v. American Equity Corp.,
ic6 N. J. Law 569, 144 At. 599 (i9"29)
(1929) 2 D.Ax. L. Ray. 458; (1923) 7 MIN-. L.
REv. 583; (0929) 77 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 69o.
'Blacher v. National Bank of Baltimore, i5i Md. 514, 135 Atd. 383 (1926); Farmers &
Merchants Bank of Wellsburg v. Nissen, 46 S. D. 121, i9o N. W. 1014 (1922).
'N. I. L. § 25: "Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract."
BRAN.AN, op. cit. supra note 1, 331; see Blacher v. National Bank of Baltimore, supra
note 3, where the court clearly indicates that the promise to pay checks, when presentedl is
sufficient to constitute value under the N. I. L. Note (1931) 17 VA. L. REv. 720, 722.
'See Central Nat. Bank v. Valentine, 18 Hun 417, 418 (N. Y. 1879). See (927) 27
Mic. L. REv. 209, 210.
dAt 3o.
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credit if the maker shows an infirmity in the instrument, it has actually parted
with nothing. 7 Yet these same courts have no difficulty in finding value in cases
where the instrument is given for an antecedent debt, or as collateral security for
a pre-existing debt with no extensions of time, or for a contingent liability. s
There is no increase in risk in any of the above situations, yet in the bank credit
cases the bank is subject to a lawsuit if it refuses payment on the checks drawn
against this credit.9 Furthermore, credit, according to commercial usage, might
be considered a valid method of payment, 10 and therefore those who insist that
the requirement of Section 54 1 of the Negotiable Instrunents Act stands it, the
way are incorrect since the giving of credit has paid for the instrument in its
entirety. Therefore though the decision in the instant case is not in accord with
the holdings of the majority of courts, nevertheless it is consonant with the business concept of value and the spirit of the Negotiable Instruiments Act.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS-EFFECT OF REPEAL
ImPOSED By REPEALED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

ON CONTRACT OBLIGATION

-The California Constitution provided that the directors of corporations were
individually liable to creditors and shareholders for all moneys embezzled by corporation officers during the directors' terms of office.' Plaintiff creditor sued
defendant director under a factual situation bringing the provision into operation.
While the action was pending, the provision was repealed.2 Held (three justices
dissenting), that the cause of action was not abated by the repeal. Coombes v.
Getz, U. S. Sup. Ct., U. S. Daily, April 13, 1932, at :283.

Where a vested right is created by state law it is within the protection of the
Constitution so that a subsequent repeal of the state law from which it arose cannot destroy the vested right.3 In the principal case the problem is whether the
creditor gained such a vested right; the state law, prior to its repeal, having
become operative so that the liability of the directors arose as security to the
creditor's claim. The majority opinion of the court, in accord with controlling
authority 4 held that there was a vested right in the creditor in that the directors'
liability, while created by the state law, immediately became an obligation pertaining to the creditor's contract and independent of the state law from which it
rose. Being a contractual obligation, it was protected by the "obligation of con(1923) 7 MINN. L. REV. 583.

SNote (1924) 33 YaLE L. J. 628, 634. See N. I. L. § 27: "Where the holder has a lien
on the instrument, arising either from contract or by implication of law, he is deemed a
holder for value to the extent of his lien."
(1927) 27 MicH. L. REV. supra note 5.
30 BRANNAN, op. cit. sunpra note I, 530.
2' "Where the transferee receives notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in
the title of the person negotiating the same before he has paid the full amount agreed to be
paid therefor he will be deemed a holder in due course only to the extent of the amount
theretofore paid by him."
C.ALIF. COxST. OF 1879. art. XII. § 3.
"CALIF. Coxsr. OF 1879, art. XII. § I : "All laws now in iorce in this State concerning
corporations, and all laws that may hereafter be passed pursuant to this section, may be altered from time to time or repealed." Pendency of action in this case meant that there was
a right of appeal or rehearing persisting since the judgment in the trial court was adverse to
the creditor.
Pacific Mail S.S. Co. v. Joliffe. 69 U. S. 450 (1864); Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148,
33 Sup. Ct. 428 (1913) ; Gorman v. McArdle, 67 Hun 484. 22 N. Y. Supp. 479 (0893) ; Miller v. Union Mill Co., 45 Wash. i99, 88 Pac. 130 (1907) ; cf. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S.
665, 32 Sup. Ct. 565 (1912).
'Ogden v. Saunders, 2 U. S. 213 (1827) ; Hawthorne v. Calef, 69 U. S. io (1864);

Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, supra note 3; WOODI'ARD, QUAsI-CoxTRaCTs (1913) I; Note
(1905) 5 COL. L. REV. 606; cf. McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154, 25 Sup. Ct. 410 (I9o5).
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tracts" clause from being impaired by the repeal.: The dissenting justices concluded that the obligation imposed was not contractual but statutory, mainly because the obligation of the statute would be imposed even though the directors
expressly attempted to exclude this liability from their contract with the creditor.,
Thus having decided the obligation was merely statutory, they then say that the
obligation was contingent, being subject to repeal ab initio, and that contingency
having occurred, the directors' liability is defeated. 7 The theories advanced, each
complete in itself, are apparently mutually exclusive and in choosing between
them a preference might well lie with the majority, the force of precedent and the
soundness, in the practical sense, of the result, outweighing the abstract logic of
the minority opinion.

CONTRACTS-BILLS AND NOTES-FUR-NISHING COLLATERAL AS CO NSIDERAPROMISE TO EXTE.N'D TIME-The plaintiff sued the defendant on his
interest-bearing note payable August 17, 1930, which contained a provision
TION FOR

whereby the latter was to furnish additional security on demand. The defendant
contended that about March I, I93i, he voluntarily gave the plaintiff additional
security in return for a promise not to call for payment so that the present action
instituted in April, 1931, was premature. Held, that there was no consideration
for the extension agreement and that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for want
of a sufficient affidavit of defense. Tradesen's National Bank and Trust Go. v.
Cunumings Bros. Co., 159 Atl. 452 (Pa. 1932).

Mutual promises to extend the time of an interest-bearing debt are usually
sufficient consideration for each other.- The creditor forebears collection and the
debtor gives up his right to stop the accrual of interest. If the debtor neither
promises to refrain from payment until a fixed time or at least to pay interest to
a fixed time it follows that there is no consideration for the creditor's promise.2
In such a case the debtor might pay in the next instant and there would be no
benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee in the form of interest.3
This was apparently the situation in the principal case so that the usual consideration element for this type of agreement was lacking.- The Pennsylvania court,
of course, was not even called upon to consider this possibility because of its
peculiar doctrine that a promise to pay interest furnishes no consideration in any
S. COxST.. art. i, § IO (i).
See dissent by Mr. Justice Cardozo.
The dissent after disposing of the contract point, then introduced the state interpretation of the constitutional provision in question. Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty, 134 Cal.
315, 66 Pac. 322 (i90i); Willcox v. Edwards, 162 Cal. 455, 123 Pac. 276 (1912) ; Moss v.
Smith, 171 Cal. 777, 155 Pac. 9o (i916). 2 WILLOUGHBY, Co.xsTrrITuo.!Ax LAW (2d ed.
1929) §§ 768-9.
:2U.

Crossman v. NVohlleben, 90 Ill. 537 (878) ; Benson v. Phipps, 87 Tex. 578, 29 S. V.
io6i (1895).
-' Bailey v. Adams, io N. H. 162 (839) ; Austin Real Estate and Abstract Co. v. Bahn,
87 Tex. 582,30 S. W. 430 (1895) ; Kirby v. American State Bank. iSS. W. (2d) 599 (Tex.
1929); ''cManus v. Bank, L. R. 5 Exch. 65 (1870).
I WI.LISTON, CoNTRACrs (1924) § 122.

'The only method of surmounting this particular obstacle would be to argue that the
debtor agreed to pay interest and the creditor to forebear collection for a reasonable time.
Certainly in the ordinary transaction where no fixed date is set the creditor's promise is a
mere indulgence and the debtor is expected to pay as soon as he is able to do so. On the
peculiar facts of the instant case it is possible to argue that there was such an agreement
since the additional collateral was furnished when the plaintiff bank for aught that appears
was quite satisfied. It would then seem plausible to infer the debtor's promise not to pay for
a reasonable time. Cf. Bickel v. Wessinger, 58 Ore. 98, 113 Pac. 34 (I9 i I ) ; ARNOLD, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANXTY (1927) § 99.
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case.' There still remains the fact that the defendant furnished additional collateral in return for the extension promise. If the defendant had been legally
obligated under his prior contract to take such action it is fairly well settled 6 that
this would not constitute consideration. However, although the defendant merely
owed a duty to furnish collateral on demand, 7 he actually went of his own volition
to the plaintiff. The slight variation in performance from his legal duty would
seem to be adequate consideration.' There are any number of analogous cases
based on similar technicalities. 9 Partial performance a few days before the due
date, 10 or at a different place," or in a different medium 12 are familiar examples.
The court in the instant case was undoubtedly influenced to a great degree by the
indefiniteness of the averment of the agreement and it is unfortunate that they
did not place their decision more squarely on that basis.

COURTS-DISCRETION-RIGHT

OF A COURT TO REFUSE JURISDICTION OF A

CONTRACT AcTION BETWEEN Nox-RES1DENrTs-X and Y, Russian subjects and

residents, contracted in New York that Y should transport machinery for X from
New York to Russia, which contract 1 performed. X and Y died residents of
different foreign countries, and Y's widow assigned the claim for payment to W,
a resident of New Jersey. WVsued X's ancillary administrator in New York.
Hold, that the court properly exercised its discretion in refusing jurisdiction.
Wedeanann v. United States Trust Co,, 258 N. Y. 315, 179 N. E. 712 (1932).
The New York courts have often refused to assume jurisdiction in tort cases
where the parties have been non-residents.'

Numerous states have taken a similar

attitude.2 Some of the reasons advanced for the exercise of discretion in these
matters have been: the great inconvenience to the parties in defending such suits
. 'Hecht v. Hecht, 3O1 Pa. 379, 152 Atl. 537 (193o), commented on
in (193I) 79 U. OF
PA. L. REv. So; Remberger v. Golden, 99 Pa. 34 (188i). The reason for the decisions is

that the debtor in paving interest is only doing that which he is obligated to do, i. e., pay the
legal rate of interest after maturity. The courts forget that the debtor has a right to pay
off thae principal at any time in the absence of an agreement to refrain. See Shoemaker v.
Farrel, 64 Pa. Super. 34, 40 (1916) which seems to endorse the correct principle but which
has not been followed.
Co.NcTs RESTATEwEXT (Am. Law Inst. 1929) §§ 76, 84 (c), and comments thereto.
p. 289. A few courts are contra on the basis of' implied rescission of the former contract
by the formation of the new, or upon the theory that there is a right and not a mere power

to break a contract.

See Villiston, Successive Promises of the Saine Performance (1894)

8 HARV. L. REV. 27.

'The demand is essential to the accrual of the obligation. Cf. First National Bank v.
Story, 200 N. Y. 346, 93 N. E. 940 (1911). The peculiar exception where demand is not
necessary is applicable only to a promise by a debtor to pay a specified sum on demand. 3
WI.LiSTON, COxTRACTS (1924)

§

1289.

' No cases seem to be directly in point. But cf. Jaffrey v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164,

26 N.
E. 351 (1891).
'As was said in Marshall v. Bullard, 114 Iowa 462, 465, 87 N. W. 427, 428 (190):
"If, however, such an agreement is supported by any new consideration, though insignificant
and technical merely, if valuable, it will be upheld."
" Schweider v. Lang, 29 Minn. 254, 13 N. W. 33 (1882) ; Thurber v. Smith, 25 R. I.
6o, 54 Atl. 79o (1903).

(1872).

Cavaness v. Ross, 33 Ark. 572 (1878) ; see McKenzie v. Culbreth, 66 N. C. 534, 536

'San Juan v. St. Johns Gas. Co., I95 U. S.

510, 25

Sup. Ct. IO8 (1904).

Gregonis v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N. Y. 152, 139 N. E. 223
(923); Murnan v. Wabash Ry., 246 N. Y. 244, I58 N. E. 5o8 (1927); Note (1928) 37
YALE L. J. 983.
2 Great Western Ry. v. Miller, i9 Mich. 305 (1869) ;
107 Ohio St. 352, 14o N. E. 94 (1923).

Loftus v.

Pennsylvania R. Co.,
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and in having witnesses available for the trial ;3 the frustration of the hope of
securing a large verdict; 4 the burden upon the citizens of the state who must
furnish the administrative machinery for the litigants. 5 When this discrimination in the assumption of jurisdiction is based upon residence and not upon citizenship, it is not violative of the Constitution.0 Although the reasons stated are
equally applicable to any action brought by non-residents, the courts have, with
seeming inconsistency, repeatedly assumed jurisdiction in contract actions.7 Irrespective of the merits of the reasons advanced, the result in the instant case
appears to be a step in the direction of consistency. In exercising this discretion.
the immediate court recognized the futility of assuming jurisdiction of the action,
for even if a judgment were secured by the plaintiff, the surrogate might, by New
York law, refuse permission to the ancillary administrator to satisfy it. s Any disadvantage or inconvenience incurred because of the lack of reciprocity to other
jurisdictions is, it is believed, outweighed by the great practical benefits accruing
to the overcrowded courts.9
EQUITABLE SERVITUDES-APPLICABILITY TO PERSOINALTY-RESTRICTIONS

AS TO AREA OF UsE-The complainant sold a number of amusement devices

known as skee-ball alleys to one who agreed to use them only in certain specified
areas in which skee-ball alleys were not already in operation. The original purchaser sold to the defendant, who, with knowledge of the agreement, nevertheless
disregarded it by installing games in non-permitted areas. Held, that since the
covenant did not run with the property, its use could not be enjoined. National
Skee-Ball Co. v. Seyfried, I58 Atl. 736 (N. J. 1932).
Undoubtedly the general rule favored by the courts has been that a restrictive
covenant on personal property does not follow it into the hands of third persons
whether or not such persons have notice of the covenant. 1 It has been argued that
to permit such results is a restraint upon alienation which is obnoxious to public
policy.2 The problem has arisen under many varied circumstances. 3 Vendors
'Great Vestern Ry. v. Miller, supra note 2; Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conzeniens in Anglo-American Law (1929) 29 COL. L. RaV. i.
'See Note (928) 37 YA.E L. J. 983.
'This burden is felt in several ways in that the citizens of the state support the courts
through the medium of taxation and this burden would be materially increased if the courts
assumed jurisdiction of every case that would be presented to it. Also the dockets of the
courts are crowded, which is especially true of the commercial state of New York. This
would prevent the residents of the state from having their cases adjudicated in due time. See
Dewitt v. Buchanan, 54 Barb. 31 (N. Y. 1868) and Pietraroia v. New Jersey & Hudson R.
Co., 197 N. Y. 434, 91 N. E. io (I9io). Also see Disconto-Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 127
Wis. 651, io6 N. W. 82r (i9o6), aff'd 208 U. S. 570, 29 Sup. Ct. 337 (I9oS). See Note
(1928) 41 HARV. L. REV. 387.
See
'Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377, 49 Sup. Ct. 355 (929).
(I931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 352.
Roger v. Bliss, 130 Misc. I68, 223 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1927) ; Crane, Hayes & Co. v.
A recent case
New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 131 Misc. 71, 225 N. Y. Supp. 775 (927).

refusing to take jurisdiction is Heine v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 5o F.
1931).

(2d)

382 (C. C. A. 9th,

'An ancillary administrator is an instrumentality of the court which has appointed him.
Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N. Y. 363, 328 N. E. 236 (i92o). In regard to the matter of discretion, see Matter of Meyer's Estate, 244 N. Y. 598, 155 N. E. 913 (1927) and Naw YoRK
Crvii. PRicriCE (Cahill's 6th ed. 1931) 731, respecting Surrogate's Court Act, § 165.
'See (1931) 45 H.Av. L. REv. 386.
'In re Consolidated Factors Corporation, 46 F. (2d) 56I (S. D. N. Y. I93I) ; Garst v.
Hall & Lyon Co., 179 Mass. 588, 61 N. E. 2I9 (igoi) ; McGruther v. Pitcher [39o4] 2 Ch.
3o6. Contra: Lorillard v. Weingarden, 28o Fed. 238 (W. D. N. Y. i922-).
2 Park v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907).
'A comprehensive study of this general topic may be found in Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 945.
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have attempted to impose restrictions on resale prices, 4 on marketing areas,5 on
the form in which the article may be resold, and on the very use of the property
itself, 7 although in only few instances has success been attained. The problem
is essentially one of public policy.' It cannot be said as a broad proposition that
the tradition of our law either prohibits or endorses restrictions on personalty.
In each instance the court must consider, in the light of the circumstances of that
case, the claims of the producers, of the middlemen, and most certainly of the
consumers. In the principal case equitable relief might well have been granted.
The agreement not to operate within certain areas already supplied with the device.
presented no threat of the undesirable incidents of monopoly. The device was a
patented product and the success of the business of selling it rested, in a large
measure, upon the ability of the manufacturer to assure prospective purchasers
that competition would be limited; not with the view of permitting price control
of a five-cent amusement, but rather for the purpose of preventing uneconomic
competition, which admittedly is not beneficial to any community.9 An argument
formerly advanced 11 was to the effect that prosperous business conditions indicated that business generally did not need the legal power to impose restrictions
on personalty. Conversely today, may it not be said that since no great public
policy was violated, the court should have lent its aid to the demands of business?

EVIDENCE-JUDGM-ENTS-AkDMISSIBILITY AND EFFECT OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION IN A SUBSEQUENT CIVIL ACTION-The plaintiff policy holder made a

false return of damage to the defendant insurance company, for which be was
indicted and convicted. The policy contained a provision which prevented recovery thereon if a false return was made by the insured. When the plaintiff brought
his action on the policy, the defendant sought to introduce the judgment of the

criminal court as a conclusive plea at bar. Held, that the judgment should be
admitted as prima facie evidence of g-uilt, but not as a conclusive plea. Schindler
v.Royal Insurance Co., 258 N. Y. 310, 179 N. E. 711 (1932).

There are two aspects to the present case, the admissibility of the judgment
and its effect. Most jurisdictions will not permit a judgment in a criminal prosecution to be introduced as evidence in a subsequent civil suit.' One reason given
is that since a judgment of acquittal could not be introduced to show innocence,
it is only fair to refuse to'admit a judgment of guilt.2 The obvious answer to
[19o4] I Ch. 354.
Russell v. Tilghman, 275 Fed. 235 (E. D. Va. 1921) ; Lorillard v. Weingarden, supra
note i; Pratt v. Marean, 25 Ill. App. 516 (1888).
American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, io6 U. S. 89 (1882) ; Meyer v. Estes, 164 Mass.
457,41 N. E. 683 (1895).
Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett, 238 Fed. 513 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916).
s"In other words, our attempt to isolate the existence of the right from considerations of
public policy, such as restraint of trade, cannot be wholly successful. In the end the validity
and scope of the restriction must depend on the extent to which the courts regard its purpose
as legitimate." Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattcls, supra note 3, at 986.
'It has been said, however, that "If agreements and combinations to prevent competition
are or may be hurtful to trade, the only sure remedy is to prohibit all agreements of that
character. If the validity oi such an agreement was made to depend upon actual proof of
public prejudice or injury, it would be very diffiicult in any case to establish the invalidity."
People v. Sheldon, 139 N. Y. 251, 264, 34 N. E. 785, 789 (1893).
Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, supra note 3, at 1013.

Park v. Hartman, supra note 2; Taddy v. Sterious

2

Bray-Robinson Co. v. Higgins, 21o Ky. 432, 276 S. W. 129 (1925) ; Sellers v. Sellers,

212 Ala. 29o, 1O2 So. 442 (1924) ; 2 FtEEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 653.
22 FREEMAN, op. cit. sun-ra note i, § 656.
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this is that a judgment of acquittal does not mean that the defendant is innocent,
but that the state has failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.5 On
the other hand a judgment of conviction indicates that the state has proved its
case under circumstances affording ample opportunity and incentive to present
an adequate defense,4 except where the conviction has been of a minor offense in
which case the defendant is more often inclined, for the sake of convenience, to
pay the fine rather than offer a defense in a court of preliminary hearing. This
aspect of the problem, however, was not involved in the instant case. Another
reason offered in support of the majority view is the difference of parties. 5 But
this does not seem to be of any weight since the same issue of guilt of the same
person is involved.( The more difficult problem is the effect of the prior judgment. The present court felt bound by precedent to give to it the effect of prima
facie evidence of guilt.- Other courts have held it to be conclusive.8 In support
of the latter contention, it may be said that neither party is unfairly prejudiced
and the desirability of removing obstructions to the efficient operation of judicial
machinery is present. On the other hand, if mere prinafacie effect is given, then
the traditionally established principles of res judicata are not being invaded and
the desired result is practically reached by the assurance that the normal jury will
attach the proper weight to the evidence.

EVIDENTcE-SEARCHES

AND SEIZURES-WVARRANT

BASED ON KNX0WLEDGE

DECEPTIoN-Prohibition agents gained entrance to appellant's lodge building by deception. Several days later they applied for a search
warrant, on the basis of the knowledge obtained by the prior entry. The warrant
was issued, the premises searched, and incriminating evidence seized. Appellant
filed a bill to suppress the evidence, but it was dismissed, and a decree was handed
down closing the lodge for one year. Appellant appeals. Held (one judge dissenting), that the evidence had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the decree must therefore be set aside. FraternalOrderof Eagles
v. United States, District Central Pa., Oct. Term 1931, No. 4662.
Although evidence obtained by illegal or irregular means is not generally
inadmissible for that reason alone,1 the authorities divide sharply over the question
Kowalski v. McAdoo, 93 N. J. L. 340, lO7 AtI. 477 (0919).
OBTAINED THROUGH

'T"We confess our inability to perceive, however, why the accused person himself should
not be held either as bound or affected by the result of the prosecution, if adverse to him.
He has had his day in court, with the opportunity to produce his witnesses, to examine and
cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, and to appeal from the judgment. So that
the chief reason for holding that the plaintiff in the civil case is not bound by the prosecution
fails as to the defendant, who has once litigated the identical question and had it adversely
decided, under conditions most favorable to himself-that is, in a prosecution in which he
could not have been convicted unless the decisive fact, his guilt, had been shown beyond a
reasonable doubt." Eagle S. & B. D. Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S. E. 314 (1927).
Fowle v. Child, 164 Mass. 210, 41 N. E. 291 (1895).
'Note, (1932) 17 COR-. L. Q. 493, 494.
"The Legislature can get over the authorities by enacting that all convictions shall be
conclusive evidence of the guilt of the convicted person in any proceeding, civil or criminal,
whoever may be parties, for the purpose of establishing whenever material the facts on which
the conviction rests. The court might so decide were the occasion imperative and the necesNity clear, but established precedents are not to be lightly set aside, even though they seem
archaic." Instant case at 314, 179 N. E. at 712.
'Eagle S. & B. D. Ins. Co. v. Heller, supra note 4; Supulver v. Gilchrist & Danson, 28

N. M. 339, 211 Pac. 595

(1922).

'Sullivan v. Nicoulin, 113 Iowa 76, 84 N. W. 978 (9o) ; Kendall v. Commonwealth,
202 Ky. 169, 259 S. W. 71 (924) ; Commonwealth v. Cressinger, 193 Pa. 3,6, 44 At. 433
(1899) ; Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and
SCi.7ures (1925)

25 COL. L. REv. II.
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whether the fruit of an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible, as a violation of
the Fourth I and Fifth I Amendments to the United States Constitution, and of
substantially similar provisions in state constitutions.' Those jurisdictions which
admit such evidence do so on the ground that having once been obtained, it is
competent in spite of its illegal genesis ;' those which reject it, base their decisions
upon a broad interpretation to the effect that the two Amendments overlap in
principle, and that its admission would be a violation of the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination. 6 The instant case presents the problem whether
a search and seizure, nominally legal, but which is based upon knowledge acquired
vinala fide, is such an illegal search and seizure as is contemplated by the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments. One is immediately brought face to face with a disagreeable alternative: should the courts adhere to a sentimental, individualistic
interpretation, which would enormously extend the ambit of personal privacy;
or should they adopt a social interpretation which would undoubtedly result in the
more effective punishment of those who are obviously guilty? The complexities
of modern civilization, and the consequent growth of the social attitude, seem to
admit of but one answer: constitutional guaranties are not, and in the nature of
things cannot be, absolute, but must be subject to a reasonable interpretation. To
extend the orbit of individual rights is necessarily to restrict the rights of society
at large. The guaranties contained in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments should
therefore be limited to their legitimate functions of preventing punishment by
processes which would degrade the court which accepted them; but courts should
not be astute to find more and more loopholes for those who are obviously guilty.'
Thus, a court which admitted evidence obtained as the result of an attack upon
a private home by police officers, without a warrant, would be lending its sanction
to the most despicable features of constabulary arrogance. But it by no means
follows that the two amendments were intended to cover every possible factual
situation. Therefore, where, as in the principal case, the evidence was acquired
through the ingenuity of an officer of the law, even though it was slightly dubious
ethically to obtain it, there is nothing so morally reprehensible about it as to warrant its exclusion, if it will aid in securing a more effective administration of
crirfinal justice. The original source of the information should be of no moment,
if its present production in court is procured by legal means.'
' "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ..
"No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ..
'Atkinson, op. cit. supra note I, at 11, 12.
64 WIGi ORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 2183, 2184.
6 Boyd v. United States, 1i6 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (I886) ; Weeks v. United States,
232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914) ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S.298, 41 Sup. Ct.
261 (ig2i); Amos v. United States, 255 U. S.313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266 (i92i).
' As an instance of the desire of courts to restrict the scope of the guaranties in question,
ef. the federal rule that evidence obtained by state officers or by private persons is admissible,
and the state rule that unreasonable searches by federal officers or by private persons do not
violate these guaranties. See Atkinson, op. cit. supra note I, at 12, and cases cited therein.
But if the illegal search and seizure was made solely on behalf of the United States, even
though by state officers, evidence so acquired is inadmissible. Gambino et al. v. United States,
275 U. S.310, 48 Sup. Ct. 137 (927).
See (1928) 16 CAL. L. REv. 246.
'With the principal case cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S.385,
40 Sup. Ct. 182 (i919), noted in (920)
33 HAiRv. L. R.v. 869, in which the facts were as
follows: an indictment was framed on information obtained from papers seized in an unlawful search of the defendant's premises. Before trial the papers were returned to the
defendant, but at the trial subpmna was issued, ordering the defendant to produce the same
papers. Held, that the defendant was protected by the Fourth Amendment, and his refusal
to produce the papers was therefore not contempt of court. The result of such a decision can
only be to obstruct the processes of justice.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POWER TO PRESCRIBE RESTRICTIVE PROVISIONS
IN LABOR CONTRACTS-Plaintiff, a taxpayer, sought to restrain city commission-

ers from signing a sewer construction contract which provided that all excavating
and loading should be done by hand labor. The plaintiff's contention was that

this stipulation would increase the cost of the work by ten per1cent. and would to
that extent constitute a diversion of the fund appropriated for building the

sewer. Held, that the commissioners should be restrained. Bohn v. Salt Lake
City, 8 P. (2d) 591 (Utah 1932).
In the prosecution of authorized public works it is generally admitted that a
municipality stands in the same position as a private individual.- Thus it may
prescribe the qualifications of laborers, 3 the time of doing the work,4 the amount
and quality of materials,5 minimum wages,' and maximum hours of labor.7
Usually it is immaterial that the manner or time of doing the work imposes an
additional cost." Though the power to prescribe conditions is often restricted by
statute, the only limitation on the municipality in the principal case was the constitutional provision 9that money appropriated for a specified purpose should not
be diverted into other channels. The whole issue here then is whether a municipality in requiring that hand labor shall be used in diverting funds appropriated
for the construction of a sewer merely because the cost of the project is thereby
increased ten per cent. In the absence of any requirement that the work shall be
done as cheaply as possible, the answer is clearly in the negative.10 It is, of course,
possible to conceive of *situations where the stipulation might be so drastic as
comp!etely to change the character of the undertaking, as for example where the
cost of construction is increased to such an extent that the project becomes an
excuse for giving employment to large masses of laborers. However, so long as
the stipulation remains incidental to the main purpose of the contract, as in the
principal case, the stipulation should be upheld.- A contrary result would permit
a taxpayer in almost every municipal undertaking to demonstrate that if different
means were employed, the work might be done more cheaply. The decision in
the principal case is not only erroneous but is further to be deplored because it
bars state agencies, already badly hampered by constitutional restrictions, from
using a ready method of meeting the present national emergency.
'The municipality raised the money for the project by floating a special bond issue.
-'Atkin v. Kansas, i93 U. S. 2o7, 24 Sup. Ct. z24 (19o3); People v. Crane, 214 N. Y.
154, IoS N. E. 427 (igi5), discussed in Note (igi5) 15 CoL. L. REV. 263.
.Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175, 36 Sup. Ct. 78 (1915); Cornelius v. Seattle, 123
Wash. 550, 213 Pac. 17 (1923). These cases uphold provisions that citizens of a state
or a city shall be given preference.
' City of Philadelphia v. Evans, 139 Pa. 483, 21 Atl. 2oo (iSi) (unexplained requirement that the construction be done in the winter); cf. Tousy v. City of Indianapolis, 175
Ind. 295, 94 N. E. 2-5 (19i).
5 City of Chicago v. Herschl, 275 Ill. 6o, 113 N. E. 899 (1916) (two water mains where
one would have sufficed).
8 Malette v. Spokane, 77 Wash. 2o5, 137 Pac. 496 (I93).
TAtkin v. Kansas, supra note 2; Milwaukee v. Raulf, 164 Wiis. 172, 359 N. V. 819
(1936) ; cf. Mayhew v. Nelson, 346 Ill. 381, 178 N. W. 921 (1931) (statute).
'City of Chicago v. Herschl, supra note 5; City of Philadelphia v. Evans, supra note
4; Wagoner v. LaGrande, 89 Ore. 192, 173 Pac. 305 (1918).
"'All moneys borrowed by, or on behalf of the state, or any legal subdivision thereof,
shall be used for the purpose specified in the law authorizing the loan." UTAH C0xsT. art.
14, § 5.
"IThe court in the principal case was obviously confused by the cases where the restrictive stipulation offended against the requirement of competitive bidding. For a discussion of this line of cases see 3 MCQUILLIN, M1UIclPAL CORPOP-UTvIOS (2d ed. 1928) §§ 302,
3305.

n The courts will not review questions of administrative discretion in the absence of
illegality or fraud: Campbell v. New York City, 244 N. Y. 317, 155 N. E. 628 (1927);
cf. Torrent v. Mfuskegon, 47 Mich. 11, 3o N. W. 132 (1881).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
TAXATION-EXEMPTION-FoREIGN CHARITABLE CORPORATIONs-A West
Virginia statute exempted charitable corporations from taxation. Land in that

state was conveyed to trustees and directed to be sold for the benefit of a foreign
corporation engaged in charitable work wholly outside the state. Pending such
sale the rents and profits were to be paid annually to the corporation. Held, that
the property was not exempt under the statute. Ferguson v. Townsend, 162
S. E. 490 (W. Va. 1932).
Statutes exempting charitable corporations from taxation have generally been

interpreted to apply only to those which carry on their work within the state.A few courts have held that the broad terms of a particular statute rendered it
applicable to all charitable organizations, whether domestic or foreign, without
regard to the geographical field of operation.2 The limitation of exemption to
charities operating within the state is based on the theory that they are performing a duty which would otherwise devolve upon the state and that therefore there
would be no reason to include within the exemption an institution which performed no such function for the state. 3 From this reasoning it would follow that
a foreign corporation would be exempt if it operated in part within the state,
since the criterion has no reference to the state creating the corporate entity, but
is confined to a consideration of where its work is done. The other ground of

decision is that the rules of statutory interpretation limit "corporations" to domestic corporations. 4 Under this view the field of operation is immaterial and a
foreign corporation dispensing a large part of its charity .ithin the state would
yet not be exempt.2 The probable intent of the legislators is shown by the changes
made in statutes of those states which held them applicable to all charities indiscriminately. The revised statutes expressly adopt the position that operation
within the state is the sole criterion for exemption.' The legislatures of two7
states have, however, shown an intent to exempt all charities, wherever located.

UNFAIR COMPETITION-EQuITABLE

RELIEF AGAINST

INDUCING BREACH

with ice cream dealers whereby
the latter promised to buy ice cream from the plaintiff only. Defendant induced
the dealers to violate their contracts by offering them ice cream at lower prices.
OF CONTRACT-Plaintiff entered into contracts

Dealers then sold defendant's ice cream as the ice cream of the plaintiff and used

plaintiff's containers and advertising for this purpose. Plaintiff sought an injunction restraining defendant from inducing the breach of contract.' Held, that no
Silberman v. Blodgett, lO5 Conn. 192, 134 Atl. 778 (1926) ; Morgan v. Atchison, T. &

S. F. Ry., 116 Kan. 175, 225 Pac. 1o31 (1924) ; Layman Foundation v. Louisville, 232 Ky.
259. 22 S. W. (2d) 622 (19-9) ; Minot v, Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113, 38 N. E. 512 (1894);

Matter of Prime, 136 N. Y. 347, 32 N. E. 1O91 (1893).
'Re Fiske, 178 Cal. 116, 172 Pac. 390 (1918) ; Sage v. Commission, I96 Ky. 191, 244
S. W. 779 (1922) ; In re Frain, 141 La. 932, 75 So. 847 (1917) ; Harvard College v. State,
jo6 Ohio St. 303, 14o N. E. 189 (1922).
Morgan v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., supra note I.
'People v. Women's Home Missionary Soc., 303 Ill. 418, 135 N. E. 749 (1922).

SIbid.

'CAL. GEx-. LAWS (Deering. 1923) 3508; Ky. Laws 1924, c. 3, § 2; OHIO GEN. CODE
(Throckmorton, 1931) 5334.
'CONx. GEN. STAT. (1930), § 1367; Matter of Hackett, 133 Misc. 768, 234 N. Y. Supp.
299 (1929) (construing Tax Law, § 221. as amended by N. Y. Laws 1928, c. 844).
'The plaintiff also sought other relief; namely, an injunction restraining defendant from
selling ice cream under such circumstances as to permit the dealers to represent the ice cream
as the plaintiff's product and restraining defendant from using plaintiff's cans in the manuiacture and sale of its products. The former was refused on the ground that the plaintiff's
injury resulted, not from the act of the defendant, but from the acts of the dealers. The
latter relief was granted.

See (1932)

45 HARv. L. Rzv. 940.
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injunction should issue. PhiladelphiaDair- Prod. Co. -'. Quaker City Ice Cream
Co., I59 Atl. 3 (Pa. 1932).
Lundey v. Gve 2 is the leading case adopting the view that equity will enjoin
one from maliciously causing a breach of a contract. Until that time the injured
party was required to seek his remedy at law on the contract. This doctrine,
limited originally to contracts between master and servant, was widened by
Bowe= v. Hall,3 to include any contract for personal services, and was ultimately
extended in Temperton v. Ru-ssell 4 so as to give this remedy for breach of any
contract. 5 The scope of the rule having become so comprehensive, it naturally
embraced contracts involving business relationships and, as a consequence, imposed certain limitations upon the freedom of trade and competition, objects long
regarded as beyond the control of the courts." In order to obtain this remedy,
the plaintiff is required to show that the defendant actually procured the breach
of contract; it is not sufficient that the defendant's acts incidentally cause the
breach. 7 He must also show a valid existing contract, and not merely prior
dealings with the person induced by the defendant. s Another necessary element
is malice; 9 some courts require in addition proof of force, fraud or misrepresen2 E. & B. 216 (Eng. 1853).
6 Q. B. D. 333 (I88I).

[1893] 1 Q. B. 715.
'But cf. Swain v. Johnson, 151 N. C. 93, 65 S. E. 61g (igog) where the court refused
to apply this doctrine to a breach of a contract to convey land.
'The court in the principal casd (at 5) went so far in encouraging the force of competition as to say, "There is no law which prevents the manufacturer of a product from
selling that product to a dealer with whom another manufacturer has an exclusive contract
known to the first manufacturer, to supply the dealer with a similar product. Any proposal
of such a law would call for instant rejection as imposing an unwise and impracticable restriction on freedom of trade and competition." Cf. Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt,
120 Md. 381, 87 At. 927 (1913) where the court held that "the right of competition does not
justify a person in knowingly and deliberately for his own benefit or advantage inducing
breach of contract by offering lower prices."
"A breach of contract is procured where the breach is directly and consciously sought,
either as the end desired in and for itself or as a measure out of which to gain some ultimate
aim. A breach is merely caused when it occurs only as an incidental and undesired, though
it may be clearly foreseen and inevitable, by-product in the selling of some quite different
object, unconnected with the object which led to the making of the contract." Sayre, Indueing Breach of Contract (923) 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 678. The principal case is undoubtedly an example of the former since the defendant's sole purpose in influencing the breach
of contract was to obtain the benefits flowing from the contract. The non-actionable inducement of breach of contract is illustrated by the case where a doctor orders a patient to refrain from alcoholic liquor and the patient has a pre-existing contract with a dealer whereby
the latter has contracted to supply the patient with his liquor requirements. Here the prime
purpose for the doctor's act is to safeguard the patient's health. This distinction is adopted
by Carpenter, Interfcrece with Contract Relations (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv. 728, 754, and
seems well supported by the authorities.
s "In other words, trade competition will ordinarily justify the injury to another's interest in trade expectancies but not ordinarily injury to another's interest in promised advantages." Sayre, op. cit. supra note 7, at 700. In Davidson v. Oakes, 128 S. W. 944 (Tex. Civ.
App. I91O), the court held that although a form of contract was entered into, the fact that
such contract was not legally binding precluded the plaintiff from obtaining any relief. But
see Shevers Ice Cream Co. v. Polar Products Co., 194 N. Y. Supp. 44, 46 (1921).
Where the plaintiff's contracts which were breached were such as to constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade, no action will lie for their breach. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
Park and Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376 (Ii)
(plaintiff had contracts with 400
jobbers and 25,ooo retailers scattered over the United States).
"alice
M
in this form of action does not mean actual malice or ill will (as understood in
the field of criminal law), but consists in the intentional doing of a wrongful act without
legal justification or excuse." Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, supra note 6, at 392,
87 Ati. at 93r. Accord: Wheeler-Stengel Co. v. American IN. G. Co., 202 M1ass. 471,89 N. E.
28 (igo9) ; Schonwald v. Ragins, 32 Okla. 223, 122 Pac. 203 (1922) and cases cited therein.
In American Law Book Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 41 Mfisc. 396, 84 N. Y. Supp. 225
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tation in effecting the breach of contract.10 The court in the principal case,
although this does not appear in the opinion, must have been considerably influenced by the absence of the elements required under the latter view. Nevertheless
there seems little justification for this holding since the uncontroverted evidence
showed the defendant guilty of such a malicious interference with the plaintiff's
customers as far exceeded the bounds of legitimate business competition.
(1903), the defendant promised to indemnify the induced persons from any damages assessed
against them for breach of plaintiff's contract if such persons subscribed to defendant's books.
This case is an example of malice as "the intention to appropriate for oneself promised advantages which another has secured by contract." Sayre, op. cit. supra note 7, at 702.
'Boysen v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 33 Pac. 492 (1893); Ashley v. Dixon, 48 N. Y. 430
(1872) ; HoPxIxs, TRADEMARKS, TRADE-NAMES AND UNFAIR Co0TPETIox (3d ed. 1917) 364.
' In Shevers Ice Cream Co. v. Polar Product Co., supra note 8, where the case arose
under similar circumstances of unfair competition in the same business, the New York
court granted an injunction since the plaintiff had established the fact that the defendant
made absolutely false statements regarding plaintiff's methods of doing business. The court,
in the principal case did not refer to the Shevers case.

